In 2014, only two states in the United States still mandated specific written informed consent for HIV testing and, after years of controversy, New York ended this requirement, leaving only Nebraska. New York's shift to opt-out testing meant that a singular feature of what had characterized the exceptionalism surrounding HIV testing was eliminated. We trace the history of debates on written informed consent nationally and in New York State. Over the years of dispute from when HIV testing was initiated in 1985 to 2014, the evidence about the benefits and burdens of written informed consent changed. Just as important was the transformation of the political configuration of HIV advocacy and funding, both nationwide and in New York State. What had for years been the subject of furious debate over what a rational and ethical screening policy required came to an end without the slightest public protest. 
I
n 2014, New York and Nebraska were the only states that still required written informed consent for HIV testing, a signature element of public policy that dated from the 1980s. New York then abandoned the requirement. Remarkably, despite a long and often bitterly contested past that engaged public health officials, clinicians, AIDS advocacy groups, and civil liberties organizations, the fi nal elimination of written informed consent for HIV testing occurred with little public debate.
Conventionally, the story of HIV testing policy involves the commitments that began when the evidence for addressing both the clinical and public health challenges of AIDS was still very uncertain. The conventional narrative argues that public health offi cials slowly became convinced by evidence demonstrating that written informed consent impeded the rollout of HIV testing on a mass scale, a process that culminated in 2006 when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued recommendations for an opt-out approach without written informed consent. Those who opposed this opt-out approach were equally certain that the evidence did not support the claim that written informed consent was a barrier to sound public health practice. In time, however, the overwhelming evidence-coupled with political and funding shiftsconvinced many individuals who had been most deeply committed to written consent. Deeply rooted opposition did not, however, vanish.
We seek to locate the controversy over written informed consent in a broad political context. We take account of how and why groups that had confronted each other for years came to see the evidence so differently and why the advocacy community eventually yielded. Although the evidence about the burdens and benefi ts of written informed consent had not significantly changed in the last years of the controversy, the political confi guration surrounding HIV/ AIDS policy had. What may appear to be remarkable was, in fact, a long time in coming.
LOOKING BACK
When HIV antibody testing fi rst became possible in 1985, there was considerable uncertainty about the significance of a positive fi nding and the prognosis of HIV-infected individuals. Within a year public health offi cials embraced HIV testing as a potentially significant contribution to confronting the evolving epidemic, but many of the fi rst generation of AIDS activists greeted the test with alarm. 1 The psychological impact of the diagnosis in the context of therapeutic impotence, coupled with very realistic concerns about discrimination, stigmatization, and anxiety about the prospect of a turn to coercive public health policy, shaped the worldview of activists who sought to protect vulnerable populations from privacy intrusions and the deprivation of the fundamental right to choose whether to be tested. Advocates argued that written informed consent would provide necessary protection for those who might otherwise be dragooned by public health offi cials. The national AIDS activist movement quickly succeeded in making written informed consent, along with pre-and posttest counseling, the standard of care nationwide. The fi rst ethical framework for confronting the challenge of AIDS and HIV testing embraced this position 2 ; HIV exceptionalism defi ned the moment. 4 Under a 1989 law, written consent became the legal norm, and violations could result in civil and criminal sanctions, including fi nes of up to $5000 and imprisonment for one year.
By the early 1990s public health offi cials were increasingly able to manage opportunistic infections and create targeted prevention programs, which challenged the empirical and ethical justifi cations for the protective framework grounded in written informed consent. The discovery in the mid-1990s that highly active anti-retroviral therapy could prolong the lives of HIV-infected individuals shifted the national conversation. Nevertheless, it would take years of debate before the requirements of pre-and posttest counseling and written informed consent could be dislodged. 5 In the face of ongoing sociopolitical anxieties and the persistence of stigmatization, evidence alone could not override the politics of HIV exceptionalism.
The erosion of the earlier consensus was powerfully underscored by the 2005 World AIDS Day editorial by Thomas Frieden, then commissioner of health in New York City. Written fi ve years before the passage of the Aff ordable Care Act provided protection against denial of insurance coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions, the editorial asserted, Given the availability of drugs that can effectively treat HIV infection and progress on antidiscrimination initiatives perhaps society is ready to adopt traditional disease control principles and proven interventions that can identify infected persons, interrupt transmission, ensure treatment and case management and monitor infection and control efforts throughout the population. 6 Policies that made such identification diffi cult could no longer be justifi ed from the perspective of public health or clinical medicine. The failure to adopt more aggressive testing policies and eliminate written consent and routinize opt-out testing would entail a wholesale denial of the evidence that, "routine voluntary screening for HIV is indicated on the basis of clinical effi cacy and cost-eff ectiveness." 7 Two months after Frieden's editorial, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene issued a detailed set of recommendations that mirrored his views. 8 It made clear that the recommendations did not call for mandatory testing but instead proposed the routinization of HIV testing; HIV testing laws would continue to require that all testing be voluntary with specifi c documented oral consent. Penalties for HIV testing without consent would be increased.
Frieden's forceful move received backing from the New York Times editorial board:
While there is a danger that some patients might be hoodwinked into taking a test they would otherwise shun, it seems reasonable to treat AIDS like any other infectious or sexually transmitted disease.
Wider testing might save some lives and alert people not to spread the virus. . . . Surely most patients would rather get life extending treatments than languish in neglect. 9 Deeply concerned by the estimate that 20% of HIVinfected Americans did not know their status, the CDC worked to update its practices and policies. In September 2006, after a careful review of the evidence, the CDC issued new recommendations for the routinization of HIV screening that involved an opt-out approach to consent and the elimination of specifi c written informed consent. 10 "These new recommendations," said Kevin Fenton, director of the National Center for HIV/ AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, "will make routine HIV screening feasible in busy medical centers where it previously was impractical." 11 Thus the stage was set for a cascade of regulatory and legislative changes across the nation. 15 Although acknowledging that expanded voluntary counseling and testing was "good public health policy," they dismissed the necessity of such reforms:
An expanded focus on testing without counseling and written informed consent will put people at risk for testing without their prior knowledge or approval-a clear violation of medical ethics and human rights.
One activist claimed, This is not informed consent, and it is not even consent, it was an attempt to ram HIV testing down people's throat without their permission. 16 30 
NEW YORK NINE YEARS OF CONTENTION

CHANGE COMES TO NEW YORK
After decades of debate, in 2010 the New York State legislature voted overwhelmingly to modify the state's legal framework for HIV testing; the assembly voted 97 to 0, the senate 42 to 10. The result was a carefully crafted compromise. The statute required a mandatory off ering of testing to people aged 13 to 64 years in hospitals, emergency departments, and primary care settings. Rapid HIV testing could be conducted using oral consent except in jails and prisons. Consent for testing could be integrated into general consent as long as a specifi c part of the form provided the clear option to decline the HIV test. It is of singular importance that once consent had been given it was to be considered durable and could be terminated only when a patient explicitly sought to withdraw it. 31 Although this statute fi nally permitted New York State to move forward, the long-fought controversy was not over. Patrick McGovern, the chief executive offi cer of Harlem United, declared in 2010, New York's' debate on HIV testing . . . has been passionate and sometimes contentious . . . while this legislation falls short on a true opt out approach, the required offer of HIV testing in all primary care settings foretells an end to the current practice of segregated and stigmatized HIV testing. 32 Gay Men's Health Crisis, by contrast, underscored that it had protected written informed consent under challenging political circumstances:
For years we have held up the standard of written informed consent as a marker for acceptable legislation to expand HIV testing. Although GMHC [Gay Men's Health Crisis] has compromised on some long standing principles to support this bill we still strongly believe in the value of written informed consent. This legislation contains as many adequate safeguards to informed consent as the current environment in the legislature will allow. 33 The compromise of 2010 was clearly only a fi rst step for those committed to ending written informed consent. In 2012, the state health department issued a report that concluded that to increase testing uptake the state might "consider additional steps to streamline and fully routinize the off er of HIV testing." 34 One possibility would be to accept the CDC's recommendation for routine HIV screening without specifi c consent but with an option for patients to decline to be tested. Indicative of the importance of the evidence derived from clinical experience, the AIDS Institute concluded, "Written consent was consistently identifi ed as a barrier to implementing the 2010 law." 35 Refl ecting on his own shift, Dan O'Connell, director of the AIDS Institute, stressed that "developments in science," the massing of evidence at both state and national levels, had compelled him to rethink policy. For O'Connell, the deeply held values of his opponents had become an expression of an evidence-resistant rigidity:
For a long time advocates were not grappling with the need to protect people's health and get the care they need. It took a long time for the community to catch up.
It was in this context that Gottfried was noted as having said how much of an outlier New York State had become: "For God's sake it's just us and Nebraska."
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In 2014, the AIDS Institute forcefully moved to end written informed consent through a provision included (some critics would say buried) in the governor's 2014-2015 executive budget. The more stringent written requirements were retained only in the potentially coercive context of correctional settings. The changed testing regulations were packaged with other measures of great importance to AIDS activists: creating a 30% salary rent cap for HIV-infected people and facilitating the sharing of clinical data among health care providers to promote "linkage and retention in care." 37 Commenting on the milestone, O'Connell stated, Eliminating most written consent for HIV testing in New York heralds the end of an era in the decade's long fight against the epidemic.
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That New York took this step was unsurprising, but that the ultimate elimination of written informed consent occurred without a public battle was stunning. The advocates, who for years described written consent as a pillar of an eff ective, rights-informed approach to public health and who feared that the elimination of such consent would allow coercion and mandatory testing, were silent.
Assemblyman Gottfried, a veteran of the testing wars, noted his surprise that he "had not heard a peep" from advocates on the proposed testing provisions in the governor's budget. His offi ce therefore contacted the leaders of New York's advocacy community:
What we heard back was that nobody had a problem with the change. . . . I didn't receive a single e-mail or phone call. [There was] almost a wall to wall of unbroken silence.
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In large measure, the silence that Gottfried encountered refl ected a shift in priorities within the advocacy community to pressing, above all else, for programs and policies to expand care for HIVinfected persons. Committed to ending AIDS in New York State, AIDS advocates now viewed collaboration with the AIDS Institute as of central importance. Most striking in this regard was Housing Works's shift after years of publicly resisting the CDC's 2006 recommendations and not joining Harlem Untied, the Latino Commission on AIDS, and the Black Leadership Commission on AIDS in their earlier calls for change. Charles King, the executive director of Housing Works, noted that treatment availability was a "game changer." To make the promise of the end of AIDS real, it was essential to bring people into care. This was not, he underscored, a political tradeoff to win the support of the AIDS Institute for the new radical goal; abandoning a long-held policy perspective was not easy. Deeply rooted ideas do not yield without organizational strain. With clear reference to those who had refused to shift, he said, "We have an emotional attachment to ideas. No one wants to admit they had been wrong." Speaking of himself he continued "I get a twinge. . . . We are on the opposite side of an issue than we were years ago." But what of those who had not publicly embraced an end to written informed consent but who chose not to engage in further debate? For some, the prospect of battling the AIDS Institute with whom it would be necessary to develop programmatic eff orts over the next years seems strategically counterproductive. But much more was at stake.
Corrine Carrie of the New York Civil Liberties Union acknowledged that it was increasingly diffi cult to argue that written informed consent did not impede HIV testing and that instead they should frame the argument with protecting people's right to choose to be tested. In 2009, she had already noted, "It's gotten to the point where only lawyers and sophisticated advocates understand these arguments." 42 Because of the shifting institutional realities of the AIDS advocacy community in New York, that constituency was shrinking. "Lawyers funding [has been] decimated," said Catherine Hanssens, who had for years been among the most vocal opponents of limiting consent-related protections in HIV testing. 43 Simultaneously, the HIV Law Project, which had played such a prominent role in earlier battles, had been absorbed by Housing Works. Housing Works now supported eliminating written consent, while focusing energy on providing treatment and ancillary services to those in need.
It was in this political context that an urgent online discussion among those who still supported written informed consent took place. None thought a renewed battle could have a meaningful impact, "the horse was out of the barn." Tracy Gardner of the Legal Action Center spoke candidly of being "worn out, sick of the fi ght." 44 For each organization that might lead the battle, however futile, a strategic decision had to be made. With no one willing to assume leadership of a renewed battle, a collective decision was made to abandon what had been a defi ning issue for the HIV advocacy community. By deed if not by word, the struggle to preserve written informed consent had come to an end. With an obvious need to view this outcome in its broader contemporary context and to maintain a sense that the struggle had not been in vain, it was possible for some to say that the legacy of advocates' work was alive even though written informed consent was over.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a rich literature on the history of science-related controversies that seeks to explain how they emerge, persist over time, and are resolved. 47 That literature shows that only part of the story is told by narratives that frame the end of such confl icts as the result of the triumph of evidence in the face of uncertainty or because of the emergence of new evidence. 48 The careful examination of scientifi c controversies suggests that, whatever the role of evidence, more is involved: that epistemic, political, and social factors are virtually always at play. How evidence is understood and indeed disagreement about what should count as evidence must be examined in historical context.
The controversy over written informed consent did not end because the evidence had at last become defi nitive. A similarly fraught and linked debate occurred on pretest and posttest counseling for HIV. There was also a protracted struggle 49 for evidence and ethics, but the persistence of those arguing for counseling diff ered greatly from those arguing for written consent. Important funding streams had long underwritten support for such eff orts, and a virtual army of counselors were employed across the nation with an institutional commitment to maintaining their role-and employment. Institutional resistance helps to explain the politics of de-implementation, but the written consent story was very diff erent. There was no army of workers whose professional identities depended on testing, and the numbers of individuals who found the issue of written consent to be morally compelling had dramatically declined. Written informed consent could no longer marshal the numbers to resist change.
At an individual level, the controversy ended because of the exhaustion of those who, under diff erent circumstances, might have persisted. New York was left behind, and so were local activists, who knew that their allies across the nation had also conceded. A bandwagon-like process had occurred. 50 Those involved in HIV advocacy, care, and policy had come to agree on a new paradigm for testing. On a political level, AIDS advocates had concluded that because of the social and funding context they should adjust their agendas to best serve those they were committed to. In doing so, they made it clear that despite its central role in the formative years of the AIDS epidemic, both locally and nationally, written informed consent for HIV testing was no longer a priority, no longer worth the fi ght.
